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NOTES
National Wildlife Federation v. Hanson: Content-based Review
of Corps Wetlands Determinations Under the Citizens' Suit
Provision of the Clean Water Act
Real estate development and environmental protection collide when land
users seek to develop wetlands.' Where developers plan to put advantageously
located wetlands tracts to commercial use, environmentalists seek to protect
those tracts and to preserve their environmental integrity. Section 4042 of the
Clean Water Act (CWA) 3 of 1972 struck a compromise between the two fac-
tions, protecting the wetlands by requiring wetlands developers to obtain regula-
tory "dredge and fill" permits from the United States Army Corps of Engineers
before development.4 The Corps has the primary responsibility for determining
whether particular tracts are wetlands, and thus whether they are subject to the
permit program.5
This system, in which agency decisions are dispositive in matters important
to opposing factions, breeds challenges of those decisions. If the Corps deter-
mines that a tract is a wetland, the developers object; otherwise, if it determines
that a tract is not a wetland, the environmentalists object. There are two statu-
tory bases on which citizens might be able to seek judicial review of wetlands
determinations: the citizens' suit provision of the CWA, 6 and the more general
1. "Wetlands" are "those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at
a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a
prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally
include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas." 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1987).
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
3. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat.
816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. 1986)) (formally titled the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, but commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act).
4. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1982). Wetlands merit protection because:
wetlands and bays, estuaries and deltas are the Nation's most biologically active areas.
They represent a principal source of food supply. They are the spawning grounds for much
of the fish and shellfish which populate the oceans, and they are passages for numerous
upland game fish. They also provide nesting areas for a myriad of species of birds and
wildlife.
The unregulated destruction of these areas is a matter which needs to be corrected and
which implementation of section 404 has attempted to achieve.
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hanson, 623 F. Supp. 1539, 1543-44 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (quoting 1977 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4326, 4336), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 859 F.2d 313 (4th Cir.
1988). See infra notes 40-48 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the § 404 program.
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a)-(c) (1982 and Supp. 1986). Ifa tract is a "wetland" then it is subject to
the provisions of the CWA, including § 404. 33 C.F.R. § 328 (1987). The Corps has the primary
duty to make wetlands determinations, enlisting the aid of the EPA in "special cases." Jurisdiction
of Dredged and Fill Program; Memorandum of Understanding, 45 Fed. Reg. 45018 (1980) [herein-
after MOU]. See infra notes 43.48 and accompanying text for a discussion of this process and of
"special cases."
6. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982). This provision explicitly authorizes citizens' suits:
[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other governmen-
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provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).7 An important distinc-
tion between the two is that costs and attorneys' fees are more readily available
under the CWA.8 Consequently, the CWA approach is more attractive to poten-
tial litigants.
In National Wildlife Federation v. Hanson9 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that review of a wetlands determination
is a proper CWA citizens' suit10 and that, accordingly, CWA costs and attor-
neys' fees are available to the prevailing party. 1 This Note addresses the propri-
ety of such review and of awarding the attorneys' fees made available under the
Act. It begins by describing Hanson and reviewing the statutory framework of
the CWA, its "dredge and fill" program, the Act's citizens' suit provision, and
the APA. Noting the dearth of case law in citizens' challenges of Corps wet-
lands determinations, the Note proceeds to review the case law in a related area:
the performance and judicial review of CWA duties by the United States Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA). Finally, using the EPA cases as a refer-
ence, the Note discusses what sort of judicial review is appropriate for Corps
wetlands determinations. The Note concludes that the proper vehicle for judi-
cial review of these determinations is the APA rather than the CWA, and that,
consequently, CWA attorneys' fees should not be available to prevailing
plaintiffs. 12
tal instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the
Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation
under this Act or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a
standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to
perform any act or duty under this Chapter which is not discretionary with the
Administrator.
Id. Since this Note addresses only challenges of Corps wetlands determinations, only § 1365(a)(2) is
relevant.
7. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982 & Supp. 1986). The APA provides a right to judicial review for
any "person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute." Id. at § 702.
The APA itself does not provide subject-matter jurisdiction for review. Califano v. Sanders, 430
U.S. 99, 107 (1977) ("mhe APA does not afford an implied grant of subject-matter jurisdiction
permitting federal judicial review of agency action."). Instead, it provides a standard for review
under other statutes. Courts frequently suggest in the environmental context that the APA and 33
U.S.C. § 1331, the federal-question statute, together provide a court with subject-matter jurisdiction
over EPA and Corps decisions. See, eg., Golden Gate Audubon Soc'y v. United States Army Corps
of Engineers, 28 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1005, 1006 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 1988) (opinion recognizing
amended order); City of Las Vegas v. Clark County, 755 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1985); Hough v.
Marsh, 557 F. Supp. 74, 78 (D. Mass. 1982).
8. Section 505(d) of the CWA provides for awards of costs and attorneys' fees. It provides,
"[the court, in issuing any final order in any action brought pursuant to this section, may award
costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the
court determines such award is appropriate." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1982).
The APA does not provide for awards of costs and fees. Such provision is made, however, in
the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982 & Supp. 1986), and this act may be
used in conjunction with the APA. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the practical availability of fees under this provision.
9. 859 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1988).
10. Id. at 316.
11. Id.
12. Unlike in England, where attorneys' fees are routinely awarded to the prevailing party by
statute, "[i]n the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable
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The facts in Hanson are typical of the developer-environmentalist conflicts
in most wetlands cases. Generally a developer seeks to put its land to profitable
use, and environmentalists step in to prevent ecological destruction. The EPA
and the Corps wind up caught in the middle, left to determine the fate of the
land by permitting development or by prescribing regulations.
In Hanson, defendant First Colony Farms (FCF) owned a tract of land in
eastern North Carolina. 13 The coastal tract of about 30,000 acres was bordered
by the Albemarle Sound, the Pamlico Sound, and the Alligator River, and was
historically considered a forested swamp, useful only for timber production.
14
In the early 1970s, FCF and defendant Peat Methanol Associates wished to
mine peat from a fifteen-thousand acre site on the tract and to process that peat
in a peat-to-methanol fuel plant located on the tract. 15 The process would re-
quire substantial drainage of the tract.
16
In the period from 1974 to 1978 the Corps consulted with FCF about the
probable necessity of a permit for the mining operation because the Corps be-
lieved the tract was probably a wetland. 17 In 1979 FCF formally asked the
Corps to make a wetlands determination regarding the tract. 18 The Corps, after
various inspections of the site's vegetation and ground water characteristics, 19
concluded that the tract was not a wetland and that, consequently, no dredge
and fill permit would be required.
20
Shortly thereafter, eight environmental groups challenged the Corps' deter-
mination under the citizens' suit provision of the CWA. 21 The district court,
citing the Corps' failures to gather proper inundation history records, to analyze
attorneys' fee from the loser." Alyeska Pipeline Serv. v. Wilderness Soc'y., 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975);
see, eg., Summit Valley Indus. v. Local 112, United Bd. of Carpenters, 456 U.S. 717, 721 (1982)
(quoting Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967)) ("attorney's
fees 'are not ordinarily recoverable in the absence of a statute or enforceable contract providing
therefor.' ").
13. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hanson, 623 F. Supp. 1539, 1540 (E.D.N.C. 1985), aff'd inpart,
vacated in part, 859 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1988).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1541.
Peat is a light-brown to black spongy mass of more or less decomposed plant debris in a
waterlogged environment. The upper layers are fibrous and often contain still recognizable
woody material sometimes consisting of the stumps and roots of what were once large
trees.... All peat deposits have extremely high water contents exceeding 90 per cent of
their total weight prior to drainage.
COAL MINING GEOLOGY 105 (I. Williamson ed. 1967). In the mining process the peat tract is
drained, then the peat is harvested, shaped, and air-dried in preparation for its use in a peat-to-
methanol plant. Hanson, 623 F. Supp. at 1541.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. A tract is a wetland if it is "inundated or saturated by water at a frequency and duration
sufficient to support aquatic vegetation. This inundation or saturation may be caused by either sur-
face water, ground water, or a combination of both." 42 Fed. Reg. 37,112, 37,128 (1977). Thus, in a
wetlands determination, the Corps must evaluate vegetation, hydrology, and soils. Hanson, 623 F.
Supp. at 1545; see also Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 906 (5th Cir.
1983) ("The determination itself which requires an analysis of the types of vegetation, soil and water
conditions is the kind of scientific decision normally accorded significant deference by the courts.").
20. Hanson, 623 F. Supp. at 1541-42.
21. Id. at 1542. See supra note 6 for the text of the citizens' suit provision.
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soil, and to evaluate vegetation meaningfully, 2 2 found "no scientific basis in the
record" 23 for the determination and set it aside as arbitrary and capricious. 24
Plaintiffs later petitioned the court for an award of costs and attorneys' fees
under section 505(d) of the CWA.25 The Corps argued that the suit was not
properly founded on the citizens' suit provision because the Corps had not failed
to perform any nondiscretionary duty.26 This argument was based on section
505(a)(2) of the CWA, which makes the Administrator's failure to perform a
nondiscretionary duty a prerequisite to a citizens' suit.27 The court rejected this
argument,28 and awarded over $400,000 in costs and fees to the plaintiffs.29
On appeal by the Corps, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the award of costs and fees.30 In an opinion by Judge
Butzner,31 the court ratified the district court's conclusion that the citizens' suit
provision of the CWA conferred subject-matter jurisdiction on the court to hear
citizens' challenges of Corps wetlands determinations.32 The court, like the trial
court, rejected the Corps' argument that the suit challenged the Corps' exercise
of discretion with respect to wetlands rather than the EPA administrator's fail-
ure to perform a mandatory duty.33
A number of statutes, beginning with the CWA, figure into this subject-
matter jurisdiction analysis. Congress enacted the Clean Water Act Amend-
ments of 197234 in order "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation's waters."'35 The Act applies to the nation's
"navigable waters,"'36 defined as "the waters of the United States," 37 specifically
22. Hanson 623 F. Supp. at 1547.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1548. The "arbitrary and capricious" standard comes from the APA. 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (1976). This standard mandates that an agency act is to be set aside if found to be
"arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Id. This
standard was presumably used by the court because the CWA does not provide a precise standard for
judicial review. See Hanson, 623 F. Supp. at 1545.
25. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hanson, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20008, 20008
(E.D.N.C. Oct. 1, 1987) (fee award order).
26. Id. at 20009.
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1982); see supra note 6 for the text of this provision.
28. Hanson, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20008 (Oct. 1 1987); see infra notes 99.124
and accompanying text.
29. Hanson, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20011.
30. Hanson, 859 F.2d at 315. The court affirmed the award of costs and fees, but remanded the
case for recalculation of the fees because the trial court had used contemporary rather than historic
rates. Id.
31. Judge Chapman and Judge Wilkins completed the panel. Id. at 314.
32. Id. at 315-16.
33. Id. The court also rejected the federal defendants' argument that CWA attorneys' fees were
not appropriate merely because the trial court had applied the APA standards, noting that "review
... under APA standards... did not alter the jurisdictional base of the court's judgment." Id. at
316.
34. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat.
816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)).
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982); see also Save the Bay, Inc. v. Administrator of EPA, 556 F.2d
1282, 1284 (5th Cir. 1977) ("The 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
joined the Environmental Protection Agency and the fifty states in a delicate partnership charged
with controlling and eventually eliminating water pollution throughout the United States.").
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1982).
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including "wetlands." '38 To achieve its stated goal, Congress broadly legislated
in section 301 of the CWA that "the discharge of any pollutant [into navigable
waters] by any person shall be unlawful." 3 9
Section 404 of the CWA, an express exception to the blanket prohibition of
section 301, establishes a permit program, administered by the Corps, for
"dredge and fill" operations.4° No party may deposit dredged or fill material in
a wetland without first obtaining a regulatory permit from the Corps. 4 1 A per-
mit is required for activities on specific tracts determined to be wetlands. 42
The Corps and the EPA share responsibility for making wetlands determi-
nations.43 The Corps, with its more capable field resources,44 has the primary
responsibility for making determinations. 45 If it finds that a particular tract of
land is a "special case," 46 the Corps must notify the EPA, which then makes a
final determination.47 Otherwise, the EPA accepts the Corps' determination as
final. 48
Section 505, one of the possible statutory bases for challenging wetlands
determinations, is the "citizens' suit" provision of the CWA. 49 It provides in
37. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1982).
38. 33 C.F.R. § 328.1 & .3(a) (1987) (Act applies to only those wetlands within definition of
navigable waters). See supra note 1 for a definition of "wetlands."
39. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1982).
40. "Dredged material means material that is excavated or dredged from navigable waters...
[but] does not include material resulting from normal farming, silvaculture, and ranching activities."
33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(4) (1976). "Fill material," under the regulation, "means any pollutant used
to create fill in the traditional sense of replacing an aquatic area with dry land or of changing the
bottom elevation of a water body... [but] does not inlcude... [m]aterial resulting from normal
farming... [or] [m]aterial placed for the purpose of maintenance" or emergency repair of existing
fills "such as dikes, dams, levees, . . . causeways, and bridge abutments or approaches." Id. at
§ 209.120(d)(6).
41. Under the § 404 program, "[tihe Secretary [of the Army, acting through the Corps of Engi-
neers] may issue permits... for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at
specified disposal sites." 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1982). Guidelines prepared by the Corps and the
EPA are used in specifying disposal sites. Id. at § 1344(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1987). Section 404(c) gives
the Administrator veto power "whenever he determines... that the discharge of such materials into
such area will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and
fishery areas .... wildlife, or recreational areas." Id. at § 1344(c) (1982). See Caplin, Is Congress
Protecting Our Water? The Controversy Over Section 404, Federal Water Pollution Control Amend-
ments of 1972, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 445, 449-54 (1977) for a thorough background discussion of the
program.
42. "Interstate wetlands" are included in the Nation's "navigable waters." 33 C.F.R. § 328.1 &
.3(a) (1987). A tract is a wetland, it is subject to the § 404 permit program. See also National
Wildlife Fed'n v. Hanson, 623 F. Supp. 1539, 1544 (E.D.N.C. 1985) ("if [a tract] is considered to be
"wetlands," as defined in 33 C.F.RL § 323.2(c), a § 404 permit is required to proceed with...
development plans.").
43. See MOU, supra note 5, at 45018.
44. MOU, supra note 5, at 45018.
45. MOU, supra note 5, at 45018.
46. "Special cases are those situations where significant issues or technical difficulties exist con-
cerning the jurisdictional scope of Section 404 waters, the environmental consequences of jurisdic-
tion are significant, and EPA has declared a special interest." MOU, supra note 5, at 45019.
47. MOU, supra note 5, at 45018.
48. MOU, supra note 5, at 45018.
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1982). The citizens' suit provision is designed "to supplement and
expedite administrative action to abate violations of the Act.... Recourse to the courts is appropri-
ate only when the administrative action taken is less than adequate." Massachusetts v. United States
19891
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part that citizens may bring suit "against the Administrator [of the EPA] where
there is alleged a failure to perform any act or duty under [the CWA] which is
not discretionary with the Administrator." 50 Section 505(d) makes costs and
attorneys' fees available to prevailing plaintiffs in citizens' suits.5 1
The other possible statutory basis for citizens' challenges of wetlands deter-
minations is the Administrative Procedure Act.5 2 It provides aggrieved parties
a right to judicial review of agency acts.53 Under the APA, a court will strike
down any agency act found to be "arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."'5 4 The Equal Access to Justice
Act, commonly used in conjunction with the APA, makes fee awards available
to prevailing parties in proceedings for judicial review of agency action unless
the position of the United States in the proceedings is "substantially justified." 55
Veterans Admin., 541 F.2d 119, 121 (Ist Cir. 1976) (citizen plaintiffs alleging violation of CWA
discharge permit by VA hospital).
50. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1982). Such provisions are quite common in environmental stat-
utes. For a list of citizens' suit provisions in other environmental statutes, see Comment, Citizen
Suits Under the Clean Water Act: Waiting for Godot in the Fifth Circuit, 62 TUL. L. Rav. 175, 176
nn.7-8 (1987).
Section 505 was modeled after the citizens' suit provision of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604 (1982). See Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 376, 383
(1987) ("both the Senate and House Reports explicitly connected [the CWA citizens' suit provision]
to the citizen suit provisions authorized by the Clean Air Act" (citing S. REP. No. 414, 92nd Cong.,
1st Sess. at 79 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3668, 3744 ("modeled
on the provision enacted in the Clean Air Amendments.. .") and H.R. REP. No. 911, 92nd Cong.,
1st Sess. 133 (1972) ("closely follows ... the Clean Air Act))); Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park
Comm'n v. EPA, 711 F.2d 431, 434 (Ist Cir. 1983) (discussing Clean Air Act citizens' suit provision
"on which the Clean Water Act sections... were modeled").
The parallel wording of the provisions makes cases interpreting the Clean Air Act quite
persuasive:
[T]he common concern of both statutes with pollution, and the common purpose of each
act's authorization of attorneys' fees to promote citizen enforcement [persuades us] that
Congress specifically intended the two provisions on attorneys' fees to have the same scope
and to be interpreted in the same way.
Roosevelt, 711 F.2d at 437.
51. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(d) (Supp. 1988). This section of the CWA provides: "The court, in
issuing any final order in any action brought pursuant to this section, may award costs of litigation
(including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any prevailing or substantially prevailing
party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate." Id.
52. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
53. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. 1986).
54. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1982). Section 706 reads, in part:
The reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory
right;
(D) without observance of procedure required bylaw;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence... ; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts ....
Id.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (Supp. 1986). This section provides:
[A] court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other
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The government's position is "substantially justified" if it is reasonable in fact
and in law.5 6
An analysis of whether the citizens' suit provision of the CWA grants sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction for challenges of Corps wetlands determinations requires
consideration of two issues: (1) whether the right to sue the Administrator im-
plicitly includes a right to sue the Corps in its derivative role, and, if so,
(2) whether the Corps has a nondiscretionary duty in identifying wetlands sub-
ject to the dredge and fill permit program. If the Corps may be sued and has a
nondiscretionary duty, then the section grants subject-matter jurisdiction.
Resolution of the first issue,57 whether the right to sue the Administrator
implicitly includes a right to sue the Corps, is significant because on its face the
statute applies only to the Administrator of the EPA and not to the Corps.5 8
Thus, unless the provision implicitly includes the Corps, it plainly does not con-
fer subject-matter jurisdiction on the courts to hear cases regarding the Corps'
activities.
The argument against the right to sue the Corps is one of statutory con-
struction, relying on Congress' omission of the Corps in the provision.5 9 The
contrary argument notes that the Corps acts as an agent of the EPA insofar as it
performs wetlands determinations, and should thus be accessible under the pro-
vision's right to sue the EPA.6° The plain language of the statute makes no
expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that
party in any civil action ... including proceedings for judicial review of agency action,
brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action,
unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or
that special circumstances make an award unjust.
Id.
56. Pullen v. Bowen, 820 F.2d 105, 107 (4th Cir. 1987). "The Act aims to penalize unreasona-
ble behavior on the part of the government without impairing the vigor and flexibility of its litigating
position." Id.; Dunn v. Heckler, 614 F. Supp. 45, 48 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (citing Guthrie v. Schweiker,
718 F.2d 104, 108 (4th Cir. 1983)) ("government's position... is substantially justified if the United
States Attorney does no more than rely on an 'arguably defensible record.' "). Under this standard
the government's position may be substantially justified even if the government loses, S & H Riggers
& Erectors, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 672 F.2d 426, 430 (5th Cir.
1982) (citing H.R. RaP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4984, 4990), or if its decision to litigate was not based on a substantial
probability of prevailing. Id. Further, an agency's being reversed does not raise a presumption that
the agency's position was not substantially justified. Pullen, 820 F.2d at 108.
57. This section assumes that wetlands determinations are reviewable under the citizens' suit
provision. This assumption will later be shown to be erroneous, but that conclusion does not affect
the present discussion of a right of action against the Corps.
58. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(a)(2) (1986 & Supp. 1988). See supra note 6 for the text of this
provision.
59. Under the statutory construction argument, two basic rules of construction support a literal
reading of the statute. First, the section is in derogation of sovereign immunity and "[w]aivers of
sovereign immunity must be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign... and not enlarged beyond
what the language requires." Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685 (1983) (emphasis
added). Second, the plain language of § 505(a)(2) makes no mention of the Corps.
60. The derivative access argument concerns the relationship between the Corps and the EPA.
The CWA does not clearly define the balance of authority between the two agencies. Many sources,
however, hint or assume that the EPA has the ultimate authority for the enforcement of the act. See,
eg., Administrative Authority to Construe § 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 43
Op. Att'y Gen. 15 (1979) (despite the Corps' administration of the dredge and fill permit program,
"[t]he Administrator [of EPA] ... retained substantial responsibility over [its] administration and
enforcement"); MOU, supra note 5, at 45018 (corps must enlist assistance of EPA in "special cases"
1989]
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mention of the Corps, yet to prohibit suits against the Corps is to make the
availability of review of wetlands determinations dependent on which agency
makes them. That is, if the EPA makes or assists in a determination, review
would be available, but if the Corps makes a determination on its own, as is
typically the case, no review would be available. The three courts that have
addressed this question have summarily decided that Congress could not have
intended to provide a right to sue the EPA but not the Corps when the two
agencies perform substantially the same task.6 1
Resolution of the second issue, whether the Corps has a nondiscretionary
duty in identifying wetlands, focuses on section 505(a)(2) of the CWA. That
section makes the Administrator's failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty a
prerequisite to a citizens' suit.62 In order for that section to apply to a Corps
wetlands determination, the Corps must be shown to have failed to perform a
nondiscretionary duty in its determination process. A nondiscretionary duty is a
duty that is required by a provision of the CWA and is "mandatory in nature
rather than directory."'63
The Hanson court had little precedent on which to rely in drawing its dis-
cretionary duty conclusions, for very few challenges to Corps wetlands determi-
nations have relied on the citizens' suit provision." There have been, however,
a number of citizens' suits against the EPA challenging that agency's perform-
ance of its various duties.65 A review of these EPA cases helps define what types
of duties are nondiscretionary, which are discretionary, and what challenges are
where jurisdictional determinations will be difficult); 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1982) (administrator has
partial veto power over issuance of permits).
The derivative access argument is basically that the Corps is the agent of the EPA in making
wetlands determinations and that Congress must have implicitly intended to provide a right to sue
agents of the EPA, namely the Corps, in § 505(b)(2). Otherwise, the argument proceeds, judicial
review would be available of EPA determinations but not of Corps determinations.
61. Hanson, 859 F.2d at 316. "Congress cannot have intended to allow citizens to challenge
erroneous wetlands determinations when the EPA Administrator makes them but to prohibit such
challenges when the Corps makes the determination and the EPA fals to exert its authority over the
Corps' determination." Id.; Hanson, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20009 (trial court: hold-
ing Corps and EPA jointly responsible and answerable under § 1365(a)(2)); Golden Gate Audubon
Soc'y v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 700 F. Supp. 1549, 1553 (N.D. Cal. 1988). "It is
wholly illogical to assume that Congress intended to allow citizens to challenge erroneous wetlands
determinations when the EPA makes them, but prohibit such challenges when the Corps makes the
determination and the EPA fails to exert its final authority over the Corps' determination." Hanson,
859 F.2d at 316.
For the purposes of this Note, I will assume that Congress did indeed intend to grant a right to
sue the Corps in § 505(b)(2), and I will focus on the later nondiscretionary task issue. See infra notes
62-124 and accompanying text. Notice, however, that the derivative access argument fails if the
Corps is not subordinate to the EPA in wetlands determinations, and that this issue has not yet been
fully resolved.
62. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1982).
63. Committee for Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage System v. Train, 387 F. Supp. 526, 529
(D. Md. 1975). The duty must be to perform a "specific, plain, ministerial act, 'devoid of the
exercise of discretion.' ... An act is ministerial only when its performance is positively commanded
and so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt." J.E. Brenneman Co. v. Schramm, 473 F. Supp.
1316, 1318-19 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (citations omitted).
64. See, eg., National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hanson, 623 F. Supp. 1539 (E.D.N.C. 1985), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, 859 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1988); Golden Gate Audubon Soc'y v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers, Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1005 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 1988).
65. See infra notes 66-93 and accompanying text.
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not duty-based at all, but involve instead the content of various determinations.
These distinctions are necessary in determining, as the Hanson court did,
whether the Corps fails to perform a nondiscretionary duty when it makes an
erroneous wetlands determination.
Suits against the EPA under section 505(a)(2) fall into three general catego-
ries: (a) actions to force the EPA to promulgate pollution standards or limita-
tions;66 (b) suits to require the EPA to enforce the provisions of the CWA
against a particular polluter;67 and (c) content-based challenges of particular
EPA regulations.68 Each class will be examined and then analogies will be
drawn between the treatments of the categories and the treatment of challenges
of Corps' wetlands determinations.
A number of cases have been brought under the citizens' suit provision to
force the EPA to promulgate various standards for pollution control under the
CWA.69 These cases uniformly hold that EPA's duty to promulgate standards
when required to do so by the CWA is nondiscretionary and is thus a proper
foundation for a section 505(a)(2) suit.70 Similarly, a court held that EPA's
duty to issue an environmental impact statement, if one is required by the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act,7 1 would be nondiscretionary.7 2
In the second category of cases, many circuits have been forced to decide
whether the EPA has discretion to enforce the CWA against a specific polluter
once a violation has been brought to its attention. The EPA enforcement sec-
tion, section 309(a)(3), reads in part:
Whenever, on the basis of any information available to him, the Ad-
ministrator finds that any person is in violation of... section 1311
[regarding permits for overflows]... [he] shall issue an order requiring
such person to comply with such section.. . , or [he] shall bring a civil
action in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.7 3
Although the courts are split as to whether this section imposes a
mandatory duty to enforce the provisions of the CWA on the EPA,74 the major-
66. See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 80-93 and accompanying text.
69. See, eg., Scott v. Hammond, 741 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1984); National Resources Defense
Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Resources v. EPA,
618 F.2d 991 (3d Cir. 1980).
70. Scott, 741 F.2d at 996; NRDC v. Train, 510 F.2d at 699-700; Pennsylvania Dep't of EnvtL
Resources, 618 F.2d at 994-95.
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982).
72. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 1349, 1355 (E.D. Va. 1978).
This is an interesting result, since § 505(a)(2) contemplates only failures to perform nondiscretionary
tasks under the CWA. The Chesapeake Bay court held that it would have mandamus jurisdiction
under § 1365(a)(2) to determine whether the EPA was required under the National Environmental
Policy Act to file an environmental impact statement. Id.
73. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(a)(1) (1986).
74. For cases holding that the duty to enforce is nondiscretionary, see, eg., South Carolina
Wildlife Fed'n v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp 118, 134 (D.S.C. 1978); Illinois ex rel. Scott v. Hoffman,
425 F. Supp. 71, 77 (S.D. Ill. 1977); United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181, 1183
(D. Ariz. 1975). For cases holding that the duty is discretionary, see, eg., Dubois v. Thomas, 820
F.2d 943, 945 (8th Cir. 1987); Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485, 491 (5th Cir. 1977); State Water
Control Bd. v. Train, 559 F.2d 921, 927 (4th Cir. 1977); Caldwell v. Gurley Refining Co., 533 F.
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ity view appears to be that this duty is discretionary. 75 This view, which seems
surprising because of the statute's mandatory language-"shall issue an order
... or... shall bring a civil action,"'7 6 is in keeping with the Supreme Court's
position on judicial review of agency enforcement decisions. The Court, in
Heckler v. Chaney,77 noted the "general unsuitability for judicial review of
agency decisions to refuse enforcement."' 78 Because the duty to enforce is dis-
cretionary with the Administrator, and because a nondiscretionary duty is a pre-
requisite to a citizens' suit, it follows that the duty to enforce is not a proper
predicate for such a suit.79
Finally, citizen-plaintiffs have used the citizens' suit provision to raise con-
tent-based challenges against the EPA.80 This category most closely parallels
judicial review of wetlands determinations and is therefore the most instructive
for the Hanson question. Here, as in review of wetlands determinations, a duty
has already been performed and the judicial review concerns the quality of that
performance. Plaintiffs typically challenge existing regulations prescribed by the
EPA for particular polluters or for particular geographic areas. The courts
hearing these cases have each held that the citizens' suit provision is not the
appropriate avenue for content-based judicial review. Since content questions
necessarily concern duties that have already been performed, the failure to per-
form a nondiscretionary duty requirement of the provision is not satisfied. In-
Supp. 252, 257 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage System
v. Train, 387 F. Supp. 526, 529-30 (D. Md. 1975). See also City of Seabrook v. Costle, 659 F.2d
1371, 1374 (5th Cir. 1981) (Clean Air Act case holding that enforcement duty under similar statute
is discretionary).
75. Dubois, 820 F.2d at 946 (citing "the majority view that § 309 imposes only discretionary
duties"). See supra text accompanying note 73 for text of § 309.
76. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(a)(1) (1986) (emphasis added). Courts making this decision typically
perform a statutory construction analysis on this "shall" language, weighing the mandatory quality
of the language against the policy impacts of requiring the EPA to pursue every incidence of pollu-
tion. See, eg., Dubois, 820 F.2d at 946-50; Sierra Club, 557 F.2d at 488-91; South Carolina Wildlife,
457 F. Supp. at 129-33.
77. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
78. Id. at 831. The Court continued:
The reasons for this general unsuitability are many. First, an agency decision not to en-
force often involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly
within its expertise. Thus, the agency must not only assess whether a violation has oc-
curred, but whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or another, whether
the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action re-
quested best fits the agency's overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has enough
resources to undertake the action at all. An agency generally cannot act against each
technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing.
Id. The Court also referred to the discretionary nature of this duty in Gwaltney of Smithfield v.
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987). In Gwaltney the Court held that section
505(a)(2) does not grant subject-matter jurisdiction for suits against polluters for wholly past viola.
tions of the CWA. Id. at 383. The Court stated: "If citizens could file suit, months or years later, in
order to seek the civil penalties that the Administrator chose to forego, then the Administrator's
discretion to enforce the Act in the public interest would be curtailed considerably." Id. (emphasis
added).
79. The same reasoning holds for EPA decisions to exercise its emergency powers under the
CWA. See Committee for Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage System, 387 F. Supp. at 529.
80. See, eg., City of Las Vegas v. Clark County, 755 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1984); Scott v. City of
Hammond, 741 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Hough v. Marsh, 557 F. Supp. 74 (D. Mass,
1982). See infra notes 82-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
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stead, the courts hold that the Administrative Procedure Act provides the only
remedy.8 1
In Scott v. City of Hammond,8 2 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit addressed a challenge to EPA-approved state standards that al-
legedly failed to protect the public health by not restricting certain dangerous
pollutants.8 3 The court concluded that the citizens' suit provision of section 505
did not authorize such content-based challenges.8 4 The court stated the theme
common to all content-based challenges:
[T]he content of water quality standards cannot ordinarily be chal-
lenged through a citizen's suit. An administrator's duty to approve or
promulgate some water quality standards might be "nondiscretionary"
within the meaning of [section 505(a)(2)], but the content of the stan-
dards is certainly at least somewhat discretionary with the EPA. The
only recognized avenue for challenge to the substance of EPA's actions
taken with respect to state submissions is a suit for judicial review
under the Administrative Procedure Act .... 85
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit heard a similar
challenge in City of Las Vegas v. Clark County.86 This court agreed with the
Scott court, noting that "[t]he City's real quarrel is with the content of the State
water quality standard, which is not the proper subject of a suit under CWA
section 505(a)(2)." 87 Both the Scott and the Las Vegas courts observed that the
EPA has at least some discretion in establishing standards,8 8 and both courts
held that the proper basis for content-based review is the APA.8 9
Scott and Las Vegas stand for the proposition that while the EPA may
sometimes be forced to promulgate standards under section 505, disgruntled citi-
zens must look elsewhere for content-based judicial review of those standards.
Specifically, they must look to the APA. A federal district court reached the
same conclusion in Hough v. Marsh,90 a suit brought by private citizens under
the APA 91 to challenge the Corps' issuance of a dredge and fill permit. The
court there noted that "[s]ection 505 by its express language is inapplicable to
[this type of challenge] .... Plaintiffs are not seeking to... compel an agency
official to perform a nondiscretionary duty. Quite to the contrary, they are alleg-
ing an abuse of discretion in the issuance of a permit."' 92 The Hough court held
that this challenge properly would be made under the APA. 93
81. See infra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
82. 741 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
83. Id. at 993-94.
84. Id. at 995.
85. Id. (footnote omitted).
86. 755 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1985).
87. Id. at 704.
88. Las Vegas, 755 F.2d at 704; Scott, 741 F.2d at 995.
89. Las Vegas, 755 F.2d at 704; Scott, 741 F.2d at 995.
90. 557 F. Supp. 74 (D. Mass. 1982).
91. This suit, unlike Scott and Las Vegas, was brought under the APA initially, rather than
under the CWA. Hough, 557 F. Supp. at 77.
92. Id. at 78.
93. Id. at 79.
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Other than the Hanson courts, only one court has specifically addressed the
propriety of citizens' challenges of wetlands determinations under the citizens'
suit provision. Golden Gate Audubon Society, Inc. v. United States Army Depart-
ment 94 was a citizens' group's challenge of a Corps wetlands determination. 95
This court originally held that the citizens' suit provision granted subject-matter
jurisdiction for wetlands determination challenges. 9 6 Upon motion of the de-
fendants, however,9 7 the court reversed itself in an amended order in which it
deleted the section finding subject-matter jurisdiction under the citizens' suit sec-
tion of the CWA and added a section establishing jurisdiction under the APA
and the federal-question statute.98
The Hanson trial court resolved the nondiscretionary duty issue by holding
that the Corps had failed to carry out its mandatory duty to make a "proper"
wetlands determination.99 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed this view, holding that "[t]he Corps has the nondiscretionary
duty to regulate dredged or fill material, and to fulfill that duty it must make
reasoned wetlands determinations." 100 Since the Corps had failed to perform a
nondiscretionary duty, the courts reasoned, subject-matter jurisdiction was
proper under the citizens' suit provision.
The Hanson courts' resolutions of the nondiscretionary duty requirement of
section 505(b)(2) are suspect. The interjection of the word "proper" by the trial
court and of "reasoned" by the appellate court have the effect of providing re-
view, under the citizens' suit provision, of the content of Corps decisions. 101 In
the general scheme of agency review, this is precisely the purpose of the APA.102
94. Golden Gate Audubon Soc'y v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 700 F. Supp. 1549
(N.D. Cal. 1988), amended by 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1007 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 1988).
95. Id. at 1551.
96. Id. at 1551-52.
97. Golden Gate, 28 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1005 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 1988) (amended order).
98. Id. (amended order). The court held, in its opinion issuing the amended order, "[w]e agree
with the Federal Defendants that Section 505(a)(2) does not provide the Court with jurisdiction to
review the Corps' decision.... We also agree that [the APA and the federal-question statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1331] [do] provide us with jurisdiction." Id. at 1006 (noting that the court had originally
held that it had subject-matter jurisdiction under the citizens' suit provision).
99. Hanson, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20008 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 1, 1988).
The federal defendants [EPA and the Corps], having had a duty to make a proper wetlands
determination and to prohibit any unlawful dredge and fill activities in the event any of the
lands described in the complaint were determined to be wetlands, had obviously failed to
carry out a duty under this chapter.
Id. Federal agencies have nondiscretionary duties to follow their own regulations. See Beekovitz v.
United States, 108 S. Ct. 1957, 1958-59 (1988) (Federal Tort Claims Act case in which Court notes
that a duty is not discretionary if a course of action is prescribed for it by federal statute, regulation,
or policy). This duty to follow its own regulations does not appear to be the duty which the Corps
failed to perform in Hanson, for "[n]either the CWA nor the enabling regulations specify the precise
methodology to be used by the Corps in [making wetlands determinations]." Hanson, 623 F. Supp.
at 1545.
100. Hanson, 859 F.2d at 315 (emphasis added). The court held further that "[t]he Corps has a
mandatory duty to ascertain the relevant facts, correctly construe the applicable statutes and regula-
tions, and properly apply the law to the facts." Id. at 315-16.
101. Indeed, that is exactly what the Hanson trial court did. It evaluated the Corps' investiga-
tion to see if it yielded a "proper" wetlands determination. Hanson, 623 F. Supp. at 1545-48.
102. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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The Hanson trial court applied the standard of review found in the APA to
the Corps' determination. 1 03 Use of this standard indicates the suitability of the
APA for such review. The trial court had to import the APA standard since the
CWA provides no standard for content review. 104 Congress intended, by the
plain language of the provision, to permit citizens to force the agencies involved
to perform their nondiscretionary tasks,10 5 and presumably whether a duty has
been performed can be determined without any need for a content-based review
standard. The citizens' suit provision asks if a duty was executed, and the APA
asks how it was executed. The absence of a review standard in the citizens' suit
provision supports the distinction between the two questions, and makes the
trial court's incorporation of the APA standard seem strained and unnecessary.
The Hanson court's task was basically to determine how the citizens' suit
provision fits into the overall structure of judicial review of agency decisions.
Like the original decision in Golden Gate,10 6 it concluded that the provision
contemplated content-based review of wetlands determinations.10 7 The Golden
Gate court, however, reversed itself with its later holding establishing jurisdic-
tion under the APA and the federal question statute.108
The Hanson court's jurisdictional conclusion may profitably be analyzed in
light of the previous EPA citizens' suits discussed and categorized earlier.10 9
The categories, taken in summary, define the spectrum of agency misbehavior
ranging from nonfeasance to malfeasance-from not performing a duty at all to
not performing it correctly-with varying methods of review along the
spectrum.
The first category involved nonfeasance-the EPA had failed to perform a
nondiscretionary duty.110 For such failure, the citizens' suit provision provided
a remedy. The second involved discretionary nonfeasance-the EPA had failed
to enforce the provisions of the CWA against specific polluters 1 1 -but the duty
to enforce is discretionary. Since the duty is discretionary, the citizens' suit pro-
vision provides no remedy. The third category involved malfeasance--the EPA
had performed a task, but allegedly had not performed it correctly. 12 The con-
tent-based review necessary in this situation, held the courts, was available only
under the APA. Thus, in the eyes of the categorized courts, the CWA addresses
only nonfeasance, leaving malfeasance to the APA.
Challenges of Corps' wetlands determinations closely resemble the content-
103. Hanson, 623 F. Supp. at 1544.
104. See Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 904 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Since
the Clean Water Act does not set forth the standards for reviewing the EPA's or the Corps' deci-
sions, we look to the Administrative Procedure Act... for guidance."); Hanson, 623 F. Supp. at
1544 (applying APA standard); Golden Gate, 700 F. Supp. at 1553 (applying APA standard).
105. See supra note 6 for the text of the citizens' suit provision.
106. Golden Gate, 700 F. Supp. at 1553.
107. Hanson, 623 F. Supp. at 1540.
108. Golden Gate, 28 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1006. (opinion recognizing new order).
109. See supra notes 66-93 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 80-93 and accompanying text.
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based EPA challenges for which the APA is the proper vehicle for judicial re-
view. They, like the content cases, are questions of malfeasance, for the court
decides not whether a determination was made at all, but whether a determina-
tion was made with adequate consideration of all factors.1 13 In each of the EPA
cases the courts concluded that content-based review is available through the
APA, not the CWA.114 Content-based challenges against the Corps should be
treated in the same manner.' 15
The district court in Hanson, however, did not reach this conclusion. 16
That court apparently recognized the need for a nondiscretionary duty as a
predicate for subject-matter jurisdiction under section 505 and held that the
Corps had a mandatory duty "to make a proper wetlands determination."' 17
This characterization of the Corps' duty was erroneous, because it transformed a
discretionary function into a nondiscretionary duty. The effect was to allow sec-
tion 505 rather than the APA provide content review. None of the other courts
in content-based challenges interpreted the Act in this way;" 8 instead, they rec-
ognized a distinction between review of whether a duty was performed at all and
whether a duty was performed correctly1 19 and concluded that the latter con-
cern is properly within the province of the APA. Apparently Hanson could be
broadly cited, in any nondiscretionary duty litigation, for the proposition that all
nondiscretionary duties include content factors.
The APA by its terms provides review of an agency action to determine
whether it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law."'120 Each of these attributes reflects how an action was
performed, precisely the question asked in the judicial evaluation of the quality
of a wetlands determination. Under Hanson, however, content-based review of
wetlands determinations is available in the Fourth Circuit under the citizens'
suit provision, and plaintiffs need not resort to the APA. This special treatment
113. The Golden Gate court explicitly observed this distinction, agreeing with the federal defend-
ants in its amended order that "the Corps of Engineers' ... erroneous jurisdictional disclaimer may
not be reviewed under the [citizens' suit provision] because the Corps' determination did not consti-
tute a failure to perform a mandatory duty. Instead.... the determination was an abuse of discre-
tion, reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act." Golden Gate, 28 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA)
at 1006.
114. Las Vegas, 755 F.2d at 704; Scott, 741 F.2d at 995 ("The only recognized avenue for chal-
lenge to the substance of EPA's action ... is a suit under the Administrative Procedure Act.");
Hough v. Marsh, 557 F. Supp. 74, 79 (D. Mass. 1982).
115. The first issue discussed in this analysis supports the notion of treating the Corps the same
as the EPA. There it was noted that all of the courts that addressed the question held that the Corps
should be treated the same as the EPA for purposes of amenability to suit under the citizens' suit
provision. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
116. Hanson, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20009 ("[Tjhis action comes within the terms
of 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2).").
117. Id. The court in Golden Gate originally reached this same conclusion, holding that "there
can be no question that it is mandatory, and not discretionary, for the Corps' decision to be correct."
Golden Gate, 700 F. Supp. at 1554. In the amended order, however, this conclusion became moot,
See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
120. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). See supra note 54 for text of § 706.
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for citizens' suits seems inconsistent with the APA, which by its terms provides
a mechanism for aggrieved citizens to seek review of the acts of federal agencies.
Whether subject-matter jurisdiction is provided by the citizens' suit provi-
sion or by the APA is important because of the differences in provisions for
attorneys' fees. If the CWA provides jurisdiction, fees will be readily available to
prevailing plaintiffs,12 1 and environmentalists will have an incentive to bring ac-
tions under the Act. Otherwise, concerned citizens will have to provide their
own funds or, at a minimum, may have to look elsewhere for fee awards. By
allowing content-based review under the CWA, Hanson expands the govern-
ment's fee-paying exposure under nondiscretionary duty citizens' suits provi-
sions to include not only failures to perform duties, but also failures to perform
them well.
Had Hanson been decided consistently with the EPA content cases, holding
that the CWA did not provide subject-matter jurisdiction for content-based chal-
lenges, CWA attorneys' fees would not be available to citizens challenging wet-
lands determinations. Fees may be otherwise available, however, under the
Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). 122 The EAJA provides for awards of costs
and fees to prevailing plaintiffs in suits against the government unless the gov-
ernment's position is "substantially justified." 123 Since this standard for the re-
covery of fees is much more stringent than that of the CWA, 124 the CWA is
much more attractive to citizens involved in this type of litigation.
If Hanson had been decided under the APA, CWA fees and costs would not
have been available to the prevailing plaintiffs. Instead, the court would have
determined whether the plaintiffs were entitled to an award under the EAJA.
Thus, in addition to its finding that the Corps' determination was arbitrarily and
capriciously made, the court would have to determine whether the government's
position was "substantially justified." A fee award would be contingent on that
finding. This extra requirement demonstrates the practical effect of basing judi-
cial review of wetlands determinations challenges on the APA rather than on
the citizens' suit provision of the CWA. This result is properly consistent with
judicial review of the decisions of other agencies under the APA, however, for
all APA plaintiffs must pass the substantial justification test to obtain fee
awards.
Challenges to wetlands determinations are necessarily content-based, and
the CWA citizens' suit provision does not address content. Consequently, these
challenges are outside the scope of the provision. The citizens' suit provision
contemplates suits to force the environmental agencies to perform nondiscre-
tionary duties, but leaves judicial review of the quality of performance of those
duties to the Administrative Procedure Act. Restated in context, a court may
ask under this provision whether the Corps made a wetlands determination, but
121. See supra note 51 for the text of this provision.
122. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See supra note 55 for the full text of
this section.
123. See supra note 56 and accompanying text for a discussion of "substantial justification."
124. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1982).
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not whether it made it correctly. This result is supported both by the language
of the provision and by comparison to citizens' challenges of analogous EPA
determinations.
The Hanson court's decision, which reached the opposite conclusion-that
Corps wetlands determinations are reviewable under the citizens' suit provi-
sion-cannot be harmonized with this reading of the provision. The court's con-
clusion that the Corps has a duty to make proper wetlands determinations
usurps the APA, shifting content-based review from it to the CWA.
The practical effect of a rule requiring that challenges of wetlands determi-
nations be made under the APA is that attorneys' fees made available under the
CWA are not available in these challenges. Thus environmental groups and con-
cerned citizens must look elsewhere for fee awards, perhaps to the Equal Access
to Justice Act, or must finance their causes themselves. Unfortunately, the un-
availability of CWA fee awards in these challenges may hamper the efforts of
those seeking to protect wetlands.
Citizens should be required to base challenges to Corps' wetlands determi-
nations on the Administrative Procedure Act rather than on the citizens' suit
provision of the Clean Water Act. This rule would make recovery of attorneys'
fees by concerned citizens more difficult, but would leave intact the proper rela-
tionship between the CWA citizens' suit provision and the APA-a relationship
in which the CWA cures absolute failures to perform duties and the APA cures
failures to perform them adequately. In any event, Congress created this rela-
tionship, and any decision to disturb it must be congressional rather than
judicial.
ROBERT E. DUGGINS
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